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Identity Politics under National 
Communist Rule
The Rhetoric Manifestations of Nicolae Ceausescu’s 
"Nationality Policy” in 1970s Romania
MONICA ANDRIESCU
Analyzing national communist rhetoric and its contingent aspects, this article 
proposes an interpretation of political discourse as formative for consciousness 
and identity in national communist Romania. Accordingly, my underlying inten­
tion is to inquire into how ethnic groups are articulated in order to prompt an in­
crease in "group boundedness"1. I take aim at surpassing the superficial layers of 
a written or oral statement while probing both into explicit and implicit meanings 
(subtext). Following Norman Fairclough's main argument, I deem that social and 
cultural transformations permeate discourse2. The method of analysis that I there­
by propose (Critical Discourse Analysis) surpasses the traditional ways of inter­
preting a text only though a mere linguistic analysis and recognizes that discourse 
is context-dependent. By extending this argument, one might even conclude that 
political discourse is the mirror image of the transformations that a society con­
stantly undergoes.
I chose to only focus on the 1970s Romania, since my intention is to look at the 
period that witnessed the increasing hegemony of the discourse of the nation and 
laid the groundwork for the maturing regime repression of minority (as well as 
majority) rights in the 1980s.
The aim of this article is to identify the main themes of national communist 
rhetoric in 1970s and the main explanatory variables that have influenced the 
radi cali za tion of measures designed for minor ity op pres sion and assimi la tion in 
Romania. The analysis is thus aimed at showing how national communist ideol­
ogy and its attached rhetoric were primarily targeting power-preservation and 
regime le giti ma tion.
I intend to disaggregate the complexity of the 1970s rhetoric by selecting what 
I deem to be the three core recurrent themes in Ceausescu's discourse throughout this 
period, while assessing the progressive increase in focus on the nationalities as part 
of the overall power-legitimizing game. I thus trace the escalation of the following 
three rhetorical focal points: 1. the discourse of full equality between all Romania's 
nationalities; 2. the discourse of the ancient unity and solidarity of the Romanian 
people (inclusive of nationalities); 3. the discourse of the threat of perceived reaction­
ary external interferences for Romania's territorial integrity and sovereignty.
1 Rogers BRUBAKER, Ethnicity Without Groups, Harvard University Press, 2004, pp. 7-27.
2 Norman FAIRCLOUGH, Discourse and Societal Change, Polity, Cambridge; Blackwell, 
Malden, MA, 1993. Norman Fairclough, following from the tradition of Michel Foucault's inqui­
ry into discursive stances, has expanded this so-called "second generation" of discourse theory. 
They challenge "non-critical" analyses of discourse, while drawing on Michel Foucault's under­
standing of power and his social theory.
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Puzzled by the causal links that have transformed chauvinistic nationalism 
into the trademark of the Romanian communist regime, I focus on the following 
research question: why did chauvinistic national communist rhetoric escalate in the 
1970s and 1980s in Romania? I argue that the interplay between the following 
events and actions decisively influenced Romania's intensely assimilationist na­
tionality policy: 1. The Romanian Communist July Theses of 1971 and the ensuing 
crisis triggered by Hungary's reaction; 2. The escalating bilateral relations be­
tween the two countries with a view to Romania's na tion al ity pol icy fol low ing the 
1977 Ceausescu-Kädär summit; 3. The increasing protests of members of the eth­
nic Hungarian cultural elite in Romania against state-led minority oppression 
measures.
Although softened by rhetorical devices, the assimilationist drive was one of 
the core mechanisms of communist nation building. Switching to overt criticism 
of Ceausescu's nationality policies, Hungary engaged in pushing for protective 
measures for its kin Hungarian minority. This was a signifi cant fac tor of distur­
bance for the Romanian national communist view on national sovereignty and 
non-interference of external actors into internal affairs. In so doing, my intent is to 
view Hungarian kin-state politics not as a single explanatory factor, but to engage 
in a comparative analysis that explores not only the content, but also the context in 
which political discourse emerges and reflects on.
This analysis will thus show that one of the strongest independent variables 
that impacted on the progressive radicalization of Ceausescu's nation al ity pol icy 
was Hungary's kin-state politics. I explore this phenomenon by looking at the 
rhetoric manifestations (mainly speeches) of Romania's reaction to several galva­
nizing events in inter-state relations.
As exposed at length by Raphael Vago1, the most overwrought bilateral rela­
tions between Romania and Hungary went on during 1969-1987. This period is an 
inclusive match to that of the most intense forceful assimilationist attempts made 
by the Romanian state on the ethnic Hungarians on its territory. Various decrees 
that were passed indicated the ascending bias of Romanian ethnonationalist poli­
tics in the 1970s and 1980s: the Romanianization of education and culture was the 
overall purpose. Barefaced discrimination was in direct and contending relation­
ship with the rising active opposition to assimilation by the Hungarian cultural 
elites in Romania. Thus, a second main explanatory factor that accounted for the 
radicalization of anti-minority policies was the opposition of Romania's Hungari­
ans towards their assimilation.
Extending the argument further, I argue that once confronted with real politi­
cal and social settings, even the most dogmatic ideologies tend to become contex- 
tualized and acclimatize to the surrounding conditions. Generally regarded as one 
of the most dogmatic incarnations of Stalinist Marxism, Ceausescu's ideology 
epitomized a mixture of antagonistic tendencies. The theoretical fusion it under­
went testifies that ideological compromises served legitimating purposes. Never­
theless, ideological bargaining with the purpose of preserving power eventually 
proved too rigid to adapt to the stark discrepancies between the rhetorical projec­
tions of the Romanian socialist nation and the existing reality.
1 Raphael VAGO, The Grandchildren o f Trianon: Hungary and the Hungarian Minority in Com­
munist States, Columbia University Press, New York, 1989, pp. 201-260.
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NATIONALISM, COMMUNISM, NATIONALITIES 
AND INTER-STATE RELATIONS
While emphasizing the rhetorical manifestations of shifting regime attitude to­
wards nationalities, this section briefly explores a noteworthyjuncture of Romanian 
communism -  the discursive expression of the ideological fusion between socialism 
and chauvinistic ethnonationalism during Ceausescu's rule. In so doing, I look into 
the relational nexus formed by the nationalizing stances of Romania and Hungary 
with regard to the rights of the Hungarian minority in Romania. This section also 
aims to briefly give account of the two key historical conjectures that place the dis­
course of nationalities in an international context and which are explanatory for what 
I consider as the three major rhetoric patterns concerning Romania's nationalities.
Theoretical Considerations on National Communism
I pursue the path initiated by George Schöpflin1, who argues that regardless 
of the theoretical clash between socialism and nationalism, the Romanian commu­
nist leaders perceived the instrumental nature of manipulating national identities 
as a political resource and integrating such ideas into an outwardly international­
ist ideology. My assessment is that not ideology was of supreme importance for 
the national communists, but securing the unwavering popular support that 
would preserve their power basis. My intention is not to downgrade the ideologi­
cal dogmatism that Ceausescu and his acolytes used as legitimacy-fortifiers, but 
rather to emphasize that ideology can acquire impressive malleability when politi­
cal leaders face a possible de-legitimation. When it became apparent that Marxist 
ideology no longer sufficed as a basis for mass popular mobi li za tion and support, 
an ideological shift towards populist ethnonationalism was readily taken. The tilt­
ing balance of the two discourses is apparent from the following quotation:
"We cannot overlook the fact that the role of the nation, the principles 
of national independence and sovereignty are underestimated -  or even re­
jected -  including from Marxist Leninist standpoints"2.
Briefly put, the interplay between communist and nationalist dogmas was 
discursively rendered through two diverging ideological narratives, one designed 
for the Romanian majority and the other for the Hungarian minority. This substan­
tiates the paradoxical nature of Romanian communism, which professed interna­
tionalist creeds to minorities while preaching a story permeated with national 
symbolism about an (re)imagined3 ethnic Romanian community to the Romani­
ans -  one based on continuity, independence, ancient roots and national heritage.
1 George SCHÖPFLIN, Politics in Eastern Europe (1945-1992), Blackwell, Oxford & Cambridge, 
1993, p. 68.
2 Nicolae CEAUSESCU, Natiunea si nationalitatile conclocuitoare in epoca contemporana, Editura 
Politicä, Bucuresti, 1983, p. 65.
3 I consider the Romanian nation as being an "imagined community", in the sense that "It
is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fel­
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In brief, in its quest for legitimacy, the Romanian brand of national commu­
nism encapsulated the two major and often-colliding elements that defined its na­
ture as well as illustrating its dynamics and its swerving rhetoric. I interpret the 
framing of Ceausescu's discourse of the nation as characterized by the need to ex­
tend the regime's legitimacy beyond Marxist rhetoric and to profile Romanian 
identity on distinctly ethnic lines. Therefore, interpretation, legitimation, mobiliza­
tion and the preservation of power are revealed as the core functions that rhetoric 
served under national communism.
Placing Rhetoric in Context
The 1970s witnessed a gradual increase in the overt pressure exerted by Hun­
gary for the promotion of the Romanian Hungarian minority's situation onto the 
fore of the bilateral agenda.
The first turning point that I identify is the 1971 release of the July Theses by 
the Romanian Communist Party. This was the first key event in internal Romanian 
politics that transferred into the inter-state arena and whose impact I address in 
this article. The document epitomized Ceausescu's radical ethnonationalist vision 
on the total control that the state should exert over all cultural spheres. I consider 
1971 as the symbolic moment that heightened Hungary's concern for the fate of 
the Hungarian minority to the forefront of the relations between the two coun­
tries. The implications of the 1971 communist programmatic document boded ill 
for the rights of Romania's nationalities and activated Hungary's disapproving 
diplomatic reactions. It is for its symbolic significance that I have considered it as 
the departure point of my analysis.
1971 was also the symbolic official moment when Romania "deviated" from 
the socialist course by integrating conceptually antagonistic ideologies into an 
interdependent casing: this was the symbolic document through which the Roma­
nian Communist Party rhetorically reconciled nationalism and socialism. It was 
argued that under the national communist regime, the previously class-divided 
Romanian nation had been unified. Consequently, since the legitimacy of the re­
gime rested on this contention, its rhetorical patterns could only reinforce that 
idea, however dissonant from reality it may have been. The rhetorical portrayal 
was that of a society that had passed beyond interethnic conflict, and whose com­
ponent nationalities were indissoluble parts of the socialist nation.
The second turning point occurred at the end of the 1970s. As exposed at 
length by R. Vago1, following the 1977 agreements reached between Ceausescu 
and Kädär (when the former ultimately agreed to insert the Hungarian nationality 
issue on the bilateral agenda), a swift worsening of the situation occurred. It is not 
the main purpose of this arti cle to ad dress the complex ity of the sub se quent events 
at length, but rather to aggregate them and extract their meaning for and impact
low-members, meet them, and even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of 
their communion.", according to Benedict ANDERSON, Imagined Communities, Verso, New York, 
1991, pp. 6-7.
1 Raphael VAGO, The Grandchildren o f Trianon...cit.
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on the discourse of the nation. Accordingly, for the purposes of this article, I deem 
the year 1978 as the second key moment in the 1970s decade.
The favorable conditions for the Hungarian claim for the protection of the Ro­
manian Hungarian's rights ought to be related to the part of the Helsinki Accord 
that dealt with human rights. Alongside the bilateral relations between Romania 
and Hungary, another significant part of the context was Romania's relations with 
the West and the pressures launched by the US for the protection of human rights 
in the communist camp. The Ceausescu regime subdued to international pressures 
to include the nationality issue in inter-state relations in 1977, but failed to imple­
ment any of the agreements reached. Encouraged by the official endorsement of 
the Hungarian state, the Hungarian minority's elites of the 1970s and 1980s were 
among the strongest dissident voices that spoke against Ceausescu's rule.
Käroly Kiräly has been the epitome of Hungar ian dis sent in Ceausescu's 
Romania. Kiräly was the Vice-President of the Hungarian Nationality Workers' 
Council. In 1977, he sent three letters in which he denounced the measures in­
tended at the forceful assimilation of Romania's nationality to the leadership of 
the PCR. Kiräly was dismissed from his function in 1978, but as a result of the 
abusive actions taken against him, he assented to the publication of his letters 
of protest in Western newspapers. The snowball effect of such an action is 
self-evident: the expected negative reaction of Hungary and the Hungarian Di­
aspora to one potent instance of minor ity op pres sion, while Ceausescu radical­
ized his rhetoric and measures against the Hungarian minority as a defen sive 
and legitimacy-seeking technique. Documented research shows that the Kiräly 
affair triggered a new wave of curtail ment of Hungar ian cul tural and educa­
tional rights, which in turn galvanized Hungary's overt criticism of Roma nia 
and prompted new protests (more or less visible) on the part of the members of 
the Hungarian minority.
These spiral ing events impacted on Romanian policies as well as discourse. It 
is the manifestations in the latter that I intend to subsequently address.
DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE POSTURES: THE RHETORIC OF 
EQUALITY, UNITY AND EXTERNAL INTERVENTIONS
As a general assessment of the evolution of the rhetoric of nationalities, the 
underlying message in Ceausescu's discourse was that the legitimacy of the com­
munist rule rested on the idea that the regime had brought the Romanian nation 
to its fulfillment -  that ethnic feuds had been brought to an end, thus solving the 
"nationality question". As such, the regime's rhetoric could not openly use dis­
criminatory language, as that would have entailed a self-undermining of its le­
gitimacy. My account in the ensuing sections of this article will be an illustration 
of the assertion that a twofold stance was gradually adopted by national commu­
nist rhetoric: the interlocking with Hungarian open criticism of Roma nia's na­
tionality policy led to a defensive ever-increasing stress on the equality between 
and unity of Romania's nationalities AND to an offensive full-blown campaign 
against Hungary's perceived interference in Romania's internal affairs. As fol­
lows, I break my analysis into sections that systematically address these patterns 
of discourse.
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F u ll E q u ality  between Nationalities
The world reified by Ceausescu 's rhetoric was a corrupted version of the real 
world. The former existed in parallel, was characterized by obsessive repetitive­
ness and was aimed at replacing the former. Creating a new convo luted and 
opaque regime language was a prominent feature of Romanian national commu­
nism. As it appears from Ceausescu's speeches, political rhetoric was indeed the 
language of persuasion, and when structured into a credible narrative, it was in- 
stru men tal in the le giti ma tion of power.
It is important to note that Ceausescu's rhetorical blueprint was keen on us­
ing such shortcuts in transmitting its intended message to the audience as a way 
of creating mental patterns. To add to the previous list, national communist rheto­
ric displays an obstinate use of set phrases such as:
"Full equality of rights", "the elimination of inequalities", "the rejection 
of all forms of bourgeois chauvinism and nationalism ", "foreign reactionary 
circles", "interference in Romania's internal affairs", "ruthless adversaries of 
all forms of nationalism", "the nation [...] will continue to play -  throughout 
the entire age of socialist and communist construction -  a decisive role in the 
evolution of society", "socialism  as an age of national reawakening", "the 
nation as the basis of the development of Romanian society", "socialism is 
the way toward achieving true national unity" etc.
One of the recurrent salient themes in Ceausescu's discourse was his narra­
tive of equality. Ceausescu's rhetoric distinguished between the "Romanian na­
tion" and the "co-inhabiting nationalities"; the former was inclusive of the latter 
(which designated the difference in ethnicity). In Ceausescu's vision about the role 
of the nation, equality among the members of the nation was to be ensured without 
any consideration of the difference in nationality.
It was claimed that this allegedly indiscriminate attitude allowed for the "as­
surance of full equality among all Romanian citizens, irrespective of their national- 
ity"1. However, in national communist language, "the real equality of rights" 
actually meant equal working conditions for all members of the society, not a de 
facto guarantee of their rights2. Equality was (conveniently if I may add) perceived 
in economic terms: inequality comes as a result of "regional backwardness", while 
equal rights are not possible without "harmonized industrialization"3. Along the 
same lines, "genuine equality -  both social and national -  can only be achieved 
with the disappearance of the exploiting classes"4. This was one of the instances 
where an inherently nationalist message was represented in socialist terms.
The shape that a discourse takes is also of relevance. In the Romanian case, 
the outward profile was often that of a historical account, intertwined with chal­
lenging, open-minded and even conciliatory slogans such as "the liquidation of
1 Nicolae CEAUSESCU, Solutionarea problemei nationale in Romania, Editura Politicä, 
Bucuresti, 1979, p. 8.
2 See Nicolae CEAUSESCU, Natiunea si nationalitatile conclocuitoare.. . cit., p. 101.
3 1971 speech of Nicolae CEAUSESCU, in Romania on the Way o f Building Up the Multila­
terally Developed Socialist Society: Reports, Speeches, Articles, vol. 5, Editura Meridiane, Bucuresti, 
1971, p. 674.
4 Ibidem, p. 675.
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. IX  • no. 1 • 2009
Identity Politics under National Com munist Rule 111
national and racial discrimination"1. Such narratives are designed to use political 
means of communication to manipulate the attitudes of its target audience to­
wards identification with the regime.
The U n itary  Character ofthe Nation
"Scientific" arguments about the unitary character of the Romanian nation and 
state were constantly reinforced, although they often lacked coherence. The other 
nationalities were presented as part of the Romanian historical and social setting, 
as having striven in solidarity with the Romanians: "The working people -  Romani­
ans, Magyars, Serbians and Germans -  have always fought and worked together"2. 
As such, they enj oyed equal rights, as an endemic component of the Romanian 
nation (which purportedly was a non-ethnic concept).
The term "national minority" was conspicuous by its absence in Ceausescu's 
rhetoric, as divisions between minority and majority did not accord with his unitary 
proj ection. The analysis of this frequent rhetorical pattern shows that it was in­
variably related to the depiction of the Romanian nation's struggle against foreign 
dominance. The undercurrent was an invariable argument that relied on the inde­
pendence and national unity of the nation in fighting off external intervention:
"Socialism and national independence are closely united; national inde­
pendence and international solidarity constitute a unitary w hole"3.
During the first years of Ceausescu's rule, a way of rhetorically curtailing the 
significance of the Hungarian minority was to never single it out and to refer to 
the "co-inhabiting nationalities" as a whole and as bearing equal status. However, 
as Romania's nationality policy became more focused on the Hungarians in the 
following decades, Ceausescu also started to discursively identify the distinctive­
ness of the Hungarian minority in the nation building process. "The specific ques­
tions of the working people of the Magyar nationality"4 -  while particular 
reference to them was generally avoided during the 1960s -  become of distinct rhe­
torical concern during the 1970s. Although not always mentioned explicitly, the 
implicit reference to the Hungarian minority was glaring, especially in the dia­
tribes again "external interventions": "The problems of Romania are solved by 
Romania [...] without any interference from outside, on behalf of anybody!"5.
Replete with historical misinterpretations, deviations or downright fabrica­
tions, Ceausescu's speeches repeat edly brought forth his tori cal argu ments in­
tended to reify the purported solidarity between Romanians and Hungarians.
I argue that in the early 1970s, Ceausescu's nationality rhetoric articulated 
the major themes that would progressively radicalize throughout the late 1970s 
and the 1980s. During the early and less radical years of Ceausescu's rule, it was
1 Nicolae CEAUSESCU, Solutionareaproblemei nationale...cit., p. 73.
2 March 1971 speech of Nicolae Ceausescu, in Romania on the Way . c i t . ,  p. 681.
3 1970 speech of Nicolae Ceausescu, in Romania on the Way...cit., vol. 4, Editura Meridiane, 
Bucuresti, 1970, pp. 803-804.
4 1971 speech of Nicolae Ceausescu, in Romania on the Way .c i t . ,  vol. 5, 1971, p. 684.
5 Ibidem, p. 689.
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rhetorically emphasized that the nationalities were organic components of the Ro­
manian nation and that they consequently enjoyed full rights. The overtone was 
that since they were an integral part of the Romanian nation, there was thus no 
need for separate rights since their identity was not distinct. Moreover, Romanian 
leaders saw more rights for the Hungarians in particular as the launching pad to­
wards subversive actions contrived by the Hungarian state. One recurrent pattern 
exhibited by the Romanian side was to persistently neglect reference to the Hun­
garian minority in bilateral affairs, while the Hungary did the opposite.
One of the central themes exhibited, manipulated and constantly repeated in 
Ceausescu's discourses was the idea of the unbreak able unity be tween the Ro ma- 
nian nation and the "co- inhabiting nationalities"; the underlying message was 
that the latter was an organic part of the former, due to centuries of co-exis tence 
and devel op ment in common. The undercurrent was that national interest pre­
vailed over any type of group interest -  ethnic, or of any other kind.
The significance of creating a strong unitary nation to serve the state building 
process is tellingly illustrated by the following extract:
"For a long time to come, the nation and the state will continue to be the 
basis of the development of socialist society [...]; not only does this not run 
counter to the interests of socialist internationalism, but on the contrary, it 
fully corresponds with the interests, to the international solidarity of the 
working people, to the cause of socialism and peace [...] [it] is an essential 
requirement upon which depend the strengthening of the unity and cohe­
sion of socialist countries"1.
Romanian communists argued that any form of nationalism should be extin­
guished; this allegation collided with the importance Romanian communists as­
cribed to the nation. My analysis suggests that the national communists traced a 
distinction between "the revival of the nation" and "nationalism". In other words, 
the distinction was made in conceptual terms, not in ideological content. The "re­
vival of the nation" in Romania held positive connotations in Ceausescu's rhetoric, 
whereas Hungarian "nationalism" was attributed various negative connotations. 
These two phenomena were portrayed as dissimilar and obviously contending. 
The basic difference was that while Romanian nationalism was depicted as evolu­
tionary and ensuring "societal progress", Hungarian nationalism was seen as retro­
grade and irredentist -  because it opposed the Romanian "revival of the nation".
I relate this to Ceausescu's nationality policy by emphasizing that the Hungar­
ian nationality was particularly emphasized as a potential center of internal oppo­
sition to the regime, one which was perceived as externally instrumentalized by 
Hungarian "reactionary" politics. The obvious undertone was that such actions 
were seen as disrupting the unifying balance that was so crucial for the legitimacy 
of national communists. In this outlook,
"A n ethnically differen ti ated op po si tion can easily be depicted as con­
sisting of particularly dangerous enemies: historical enemies, enemies who
1 Nicolae CEAUSESCU, Romania on the Way o f Completing Socialist Construction: Reports, 
Speeches, Articles, vol. 1, Editura Meridiane, Bucuresti, 1969, p. 60, quoted in Katherine VERDERY, 
National Ideology Under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceausescu 's Romania, University 
of California Press, Berkeley, LA & London, 1991, p. 117.
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do not accept the current identity of the state, enemies who are plotting to 
break up the state or to steal it for their own group"1.
Fear o f  External Intervention
During the '70s, Romanian communists grew increasingly more apprehen­
sive of Hungary's attempted involvement in what they deemed as essen tially an 
internal matter. Hungary's articulation of its pro-Hungarian minority stance 
found its rhetoric rej oinder in regime statements such as that of Paul Ni- 
culescu-Mizil (one of the high-ranking communists): "Romania cannot permit any 
attempts at nationalism or chauvinism-mongering"2.
In the late 1970s, national communist discourse gradually turned more his- 
toricist, more radical and more offensive. This marks a turning point in the evolu­
tion of Ceausescu's rhetoric on the nationality issue, as it started to increase in the 
radicalism with which it defends the independence and the unity of the Romanian 
nation and reverts to historical themes to mobilize support. Unsurprisingly, this 
resulted in an increasingly critical attitude of the Hungarian state (manifested at 
the official level and through exchanges of articles), which devel oped across the 
1980s and contributed to the most repressive decade of Romanian communism 
(not only for the nationalities, but also for the ethnic Romanians). It was at this 
point that the discourse of the "organic nation" clearly overshadowed the Marxist 
ideological elements of Ceausescu's rhetoric.
The softer, less apprehensive tone of the 1960s and early 1970s was replaced 
in the late 1970s by forthright accusations aimed as a response to the increasing 
diplomatic pressures exerted by Hungary. The rhetorical weight attached to as­
sumed attempts of "reactionary external interventions" that allegedly tried to de­
stabilize Romania's unity, independence and national sovereignty run an 
escalating course throughout the 1970s. The international political context was 
thus increasingly projected into the official discourse, as Ceausescu's "rhetorical 
concern for the nationalities became more pronounced"3.
Within this backdrop, an ideol ogi cal in con gru ity ap peared in the 1970s, 
namely the cumbersome interplay between internationalism, nationalism and na­
tionalities. This was another instance when Ceausescu's rhetorical arguments 
were at odds with the policies the regime actually set forth. They are, however, 
paradoxically aimed at justifying them. The ensuing quotation is illustrative of the 
flawed internal cohesion of Ceausescu's arguments -  he argues for Romania's in­
dependent path towards socialism, but he simultaneously rejects the very basis on 
which he makes this claim:
"So cial ism and communism cannot be built on the bases of nationali­
ties; there is no Romanian, Hungarian, German, Bulgarian, French socialism 
[...] The new social order entails the liquidation of exploitation, abuse and
1 Donald L. HOROWITZ, "Democracy in Divided Societies", in Larry DIAMOND, Marc F. 
PLATTNER (eds.), Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Democracy, Johns Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore & London, 1994, p. 36.
2 1971 article published by Paul Niculescu-Mizil, quoted in Raphael VAGO, The Grandchildren 
o f Trianon. ..cit., p. 204.
3 Mary Ellen FISCHER, Nicolae Ceausescu: A Study in Political Leadership, Lynne Rienner Pu­
blishers, Boulder & London, 1989, p. 243.
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. IX  • no. 1 • 2009
114 M O N IC A  A N D RIESC U
so cial and national inequalities, the full equality of rights among all the citi­
zens of a country, among all workers, regardless of their nationality"1.
This quotation uncovers an overall infusion of and tension between socialist 
rhetoric and national rhetoric. Analyzing nationalist language can prove to be an ef­
fective tool in surveying how human psyche can be manipulated. Discourse is in the 
end a most powerful means of reproduction both of ethnic divide and of political 
power. As such, I argue that analyzing Romanian na tional com mu nist lan guage is a 
significant component of any comprehensive attempt to fathom its inner workings.
One of the catchiest nuances in Ceausescu 's rhetoric was its "firm" denuncia­
tion of
"any mani fes ta tion of chauvin ism and nationalism, of any attempts by reac­
tionary foreign circles to denigrate our party's and state's national politics, 
the construction of socialism in Rom ania"2.
This passage is only one of many similar constructs that rhet ori cally dis card 
nationalism. Inferring from this, my claim is that in the interpretation of Ceausescu 
and his acolytes, na tion al ism acquired new overtones, which implic itly de fined it 
as the inherent right of a nation to replicate its culture. The argument is made circu­
lar by explicit and recurrent statements that the nationalities are in fact components 
of the nation. Ceausescu's discourses repeatedly emphasized the external threat 
(Hungary) more than the internal one (the Hungarian minority). This argument 
was progressively more visible once Hungarian foreign politics increasingly ar­
ticulated critical positions towards Romania's nationality policy.
Rhetorically nurturing insecurities proved another valuable tool of mobiliza­
tion and legitimation for the communist regime, as conspiracy theories ranked 
high in its mainstream discourse. The alleged threats to Romania's territorial integ­
rity and sovereignty were core discursive devices, which were directly aimed at 
Hungary's continued efforts to press for the rights of the Hungarian nationality. 
Their repetitiveness was aimed at creating a collective psychosis that would result 
in a more compelling popular support for the regime and a pervasive intoxicated 
perspective on inter-ethnic relations. The communist elites promoted the danger­
ous implications of subversive factors which (supposedly) loomed both from the 
outside (the USSR, Hungary and later the Hungarian emigres in the US) as well as 
from the inside (pointing to the disloyalty the Hungarian minority supposedly 
nurtured disloyal relations with Hungary).
Territory is a defining feature of Romanian communist nationalism. Therefore, 
one may logically infer that the rhetoric reification of the Romanian nation was 
constructed by comparison and contrast with a external element (the Hungarian 
nation) that became internalized and possibly threatening due to the significant 
and quite organized Hungarian minority in Romania.
To support this argument, I explain the 1970's and 1980s forced mass migration 
of Jews and Germans from Romania3 as correlations of the "territoriality" factor. 
Apart from the economic reasons that prompted this policy, another element was
1 Nicolae CEAUSESCU, Solutionarea problemei n ation a le.cit., p. 48.
2 Ibidem, p. 82.
3 For more details on the forced migration of Jews and Germans from Romania, see Radu 
IOANID, Rascumpararea evreilor: Istoria acordurilor secrete dintre Romania si Israel, Romanian transl. 
by C. Dumea and M. Mircea, Polirom, Iasi, 2005.
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consequential -  neither Israel nor Germany could have territorial claims on Roma­
nia. This exclusionary type of nationalism was clearly different from the assimi la- 
tory type directed at the Hungarian minority.
An argument that supports this thesis is put forward by Rudolf Joo, who con­
tends that although the national communist regime was deeply ethnocentric, occa­
sional concessions were made to minorities, as part of a game of "give and take". 
This strategy's prime aim was that after a stage of intensification in curtailing mi­
nority rights, there were periodic concessions that were aimed at mitigating the 
tone of minority dissent1. These shifts in emphasis were also reflected in the re­
gime's increasing rhetorical rejection of external intrusion in what was perceived 
as falling under the exclusive authority of the Romanian state.
To illustrate the obvious connection between the external political context 
and Romania's nationality policy, I refer to one of Ceausescu 's speeches in the late 
1970s, one which warns against "the use of nationalities as a pretext for interfer­
ence in Romania's internal affairs"2. At that time, there existed more or less overt 
disputes between Hungary and Romania concerning the importance that national 
minorities should have in shaping inter-state political relations. Romanian com­
munists were keen on keeping matters regarding nationalities entirely in the 
hands of the Romanian state, while Hungary argued for the "externationaliza- 
tion" of this matter. One of the resulting claims was the constant monitoring on 
the part of the Hungarian state. The counterbalancing act to these repeated pres­
sures coming from Hungary found its discursive discharge in speeches or state­
ments such as the afore-mentioned one.
As an overall characteristic of Ceausescu's discourse, the wide uses of euphe­
misms or ill-defined concepts as key mechanisms of manipulating standard lan­
guage and creating a new pool of words to express (or rather veil) national 
communism realities. Therefore, I argue that the underlying national communist 
rhetoric pattern was the sheer "dichotomy of word and fact"3. To just offer a selec­
tion of examples, I would point to often empty catchphrases such as
"the fulfillment of the tasks of the socialist development of Romania"; "m ate­
rial and cultural welfare of the entire people"; "social advancement [as] the 
ba sis for ensuring the genuine equality of rights of all working people, re­
gardless of nationality"; "the united struggle of the entire people"; "the blos­
soming of the spiritual life of co-inhabiting nationalities"; "brotherhood of 
working, fighting and ideals"; "the liquidation of social and national exploita­
tion"; "full equality of rights among all citizens, irrespective of nationality";
"the national problem in the context of the edification of the multilaterally 
developed socialist society";
the thesis according to which Romania is a multinational state "doesn't corre­
spond to reality", while the fact that different nationalities live on Romania's terri­
tory is the result of "historical developments" etc.4
1 Rudolf JOO, The Hungarian Minority's Situation in Ceausescu's Romania, English transl. by 
C. Tennant, Columbia University Press, New York, 1994, p. 46.
2 Nicolae CEAUSESCU, Solutionarea problemei nationale.. .cit., p. 83.
3 My reasoning was prompted by J.W. Young's analysis of totalitarian language's "dichotomy 
of word and fact". J.W. YOUNG, Totalitarian Language: Orwell's Newspeak and Its Nazi and Communist 
Antecedents, University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville & London, 1991.
4 These standard phrases are recurrent (in either identical or very similar format) throughout 
the range of discourses falling under scrutiny in this article: Nicolae Ceausescu, 1970, 1971, 1979 etc.
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CONCLUSIONS
This article has critically analyzed the key rhetoric patterns that the Ceausescu 
regime used to mold ethnic belonging into a prime marker of popular allegiance 
and legitimation. I have argued that national communist rhetoric (as the regime 
itself) can be better understood if related with at least two contiguous elements1: 
Hungary's kin-state policies and its support for the mobilization of Romania's 
Hungarian minority against its attempted forced assimilation; and the resistance 
of the ethnic Hungarians themselves against oppressive measures aimed at dis­
solving their cultural identity.
My aim has been to assess whether there existed a direct and determining re­
lationship between the aforementioned factors. Due to the narrow scope of this 
article, I have chosen to focus less on the description of events and more on Roma­
nia's reaction to external pressures for minority protection (as it was reflected in 
the offi cial discourse).
Without falling into the trap of retrospective determinism, the patterns of na­
tional communist rhetoric do show a constant trend of "evolution". The major 
themes are largely the same in the period under scrutiny in this article (1970), but 
one can easily discern important shifts along that line -  first and foremost in terms 
of their escalation. While initially falling under a general defensive reconciliatory 
tone, the 1970s subsequently marked the passage to a progressively offensive 
tenor (inflamed in the 1980s).
The two-fold manifestations of the Ceausescu regime -  the defensive inclu­
sive rhetoric and the offensive anti-minority policies -  were thus vital in keeping 
the Hungarian minority's political mobilization under the warning level for the 
regime's stability and undisputed legitimacy. As previously emphasized, one of 
the markers of national communist discourse was a "smokescreen" rhetoric that 
provided the perfect cover for ethnonationalist policies of forced assimilationist. 
Although the language of national communism started off as rather covert in its 
intentions towards the Hungarian nationality, the 1970s witness a gradual process 
through which the Romanian Hungarians were singled out as direct targets of 
rhetoric (and practices). The policies that were aimed at the destruction of the Hun­
garian identity and cultural specificity were shunned under the euphemistic use 
of terms. However, a careful reading can detect progressively overt connotations 
and uncompromising implications. Overall, Ceausescu's national communist 
rhetoric was context-dependent and thus shifted both in terms of shape (selective 
emphasis) and in content (gradual radicalization).
One of the defining features of Ceausescu's Romania was that rhetoric and 
social facts were at odds. Romanian elites engaged in a reversed process: rhetori­
cal means and highly repressive actions were the leaders' instruments in "imagin­
ing" social facts and reinterpreting them according to ideological lines. Intended 
at effacing ethnic diversity and ensuring the undisputed hegemony of the Com­
munist Party over the Romanian nation, this rhetorical charade had disas trous ef­
fects on the Romanian society in general and on the cultural specificity and 
identity of Romania's minorities in particular.
1 I apply Rogers Brubaker's "triadic nexus" to the Romanian case. See Rogers BRUBAKER, 
Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1996.
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There evidently was a direct relationship between the increasingly prominent 
place that nationalities were rhetorically attributed and the deterioration in their 
formal and de facto social, cultural and educational conditions. Rhetoric -  far from 
mirroring the society -  was only a counterfeit representation of it and attempted 
to "create an utterly false image of the world"1. Ironically, the ever-growing fissure 
that was created between rhetoric fiction and reality eventually became one of the 
key factors of the disintegration of regime legitimacy. One may thus conclude that 
national communist rhetoric regarding the nationality issue exhibited a striking 
similarity of themes -  captured by my analysis -  but also revealed the evolution in 
their increasingly aggressive and radical articu la tion.
The recurrent emphasis on the alleged "external interference" in Romania's 
internal affairs epitomizes the weight Romanian communists placed on the poten­
tially threatening role of the Hungarian state for the regime's preservation of pow­
er. On the other hand, the rhetoric theme avowing the unity and soli dar ity of the 
Romanian people was intended at effacing the cultural, linguistic and religious dif­
ferences that existed between the Romanian citizens, and had as key target the 
Hungarian identity.
Identity proved to be immensely resourceful for the Romanian communist re­
gime (as had for others during previous times). The capital offered by this type of 
politics was overwhelming. It also went amiss. It was not only detrimental to the 
Hungarian identity or that of other minorities, but also to the Romanian one. Un­
der the protective facet of the regime with respect to Romanian identity lay hid­
den an aspiration to form a new identity, one that was to even out cultural 
differences into a common and unsighted allegiance to a ruinous ideology. Forms 
of dissent such as the preservation of identity against homogenizing trends ought 
thus be seen as a key factor that hampered an even deeper rooting of the commu­
nist mindset into the psyche of all of Romania's denizens.
1 J.W. YOUNG, Totalitarian Language.cit., p. 61. 
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